TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/112089/11208900.063

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 10.9 KB | 212 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 36

Is One Germany Better Than Two?


Western leaders liked to call for reunification when they
thought such prayers were in no danger of being answered. Now
they must worry about keeping Europe stable

By Walter Isaacson


    "I love Germany so much," wrote the French novelist
Francois Mauriac, "that I am glad there are two of them." That
phrase is cited with increasing frequency these days, but the
sentiment is old. Clemenceau expressed it first as he wistfully
reflected on the delicate balance of power nurtured in the 19th
century by Austria's Prince Metternich. Since World War II the
division of Germany has been central both to the tensions of the
cold war and to the stability of the cold peace that accompanied
it.

    Throughout this period West Germany's allies paid facile
allegiance to the goal of reunification, treating with abandon
the fact that this simple dream involved some nightmarish
complexities. It was an easy wish to proclaim, since it did not
seem that the gods would ever grant it. Now, amid the widespread
Western joy over last week's freedom dance at the Brandenburg
Gate, comes a more sobering realization: the postwar division
of both Germany and Europe seems to be tumbling toward the ash
heap of history faster than preparations are being made for
whatever new order might arise in its stead.

    The two alliances that have divided Europe (and Germany)
for 40 years seem less urgent militarily in the Gorbachev era.
But they now must play a political role that is no less
critical. At the beginning of 1989, way back when Hungary's
Communist rulers were just considering whether to allow
independent parties and Poland's were still debating whether to
talk with Solidarity, the challenge seemed to be to find ways
to ease Eastern Europe from the claws that had clutched it for
four decades. In fact, Moscow seemed all too eager to remove
those claws. So eleven amazing months later, amid the euphoria
over headlines and live telecasts that continue to amaze, comes
an added and even trickier challenge: steering Europe toward a
continent free of rivalries -- with an unthreatening Germany in
the middle and a secure U.S.S.R. on the edge.

    The foundation of the old European order was the formal
creation of two Germanys in 1949 and the decision by Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer a few years later to tether West Germany to the
Atlantic Alliance. For the Soviet Union, which subjugated East
Germany as a satellite and buffer, this meant that any war with
the West would occur on German rather than Russian soil. For the
other Europeans, it meant a respite from the problem of German
militarism. For the U.S., it made possible the creation of a
strong NATO alliance to lead the struggle for containing the
Soviets.

    Enshrined in the constitution that established West Germany
was the goal of reunification, but even conservative leaders
there were privately saying as recently as six months ago that
this was a theoretical aim, not an immediate one. In January
East German leader Erich Honecker said he could envision the
100-mile barbed barrier around West Berlin that was the
grotesque symbol of Germany's division remaining in place for
another century. Few would have challenged that prediction.

    Honecker was off by 99 years; the Wall lasted barely three
weeks longer than he did. Likewise, the rigid repression of his
Stalinist system is suddenly dissipating. So, at least on the
surface, the question of reunification has become more real.
Stripped of its walls and barbed wire, shorn of its oppressive
ideology, lacking history or tradition, East Germany would seem
to have little reason to exist as a separate state. The East
German dilemma, says Henry Kissinger, is that "liberalization
will undermine its reason for being."

    Nevertheless, reunification of Germany into a giant that
would overwhelm Europe the way it would dominate an Olympic
Games is, at least in the immediate future, probably not likely
and perhaps not wise. Beneath the surface, there are factors
even within the Germanys that make a headlong rush to unity
unlikely. Although 40 years may not be long enough to create the
distinct cultural identity that distinguishes, say, Austrians
or Swiss from their German brethren, East and West Germany have
developed different values, styles and outlooks.

    Even apart from their ideological systems, two separate
sets of governmental institutions have been firmly embedded.
Though most Germans chafe at the division imposed by the loss
of a war, not everyone in the East wants to be subsumed into the
Federal Republic and ruled from Bonn. At an extraordinary news
conference (both for its candor and the fact that it took place
at all), the East German Ambassador to Washington, Gerhard
Herder, replied when asked if he saw a unified Germany, "In my
dreams, yes, but being a politician and standing with both my
feet on the earth, I don't see a possibility in the foreseeable
future."

    Significant moves toward unification would be difficult
without the concurrence of the rest of Europe and, more
formally, the consent of the former "occupying powers" (the
U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union), which technically
still must approve changes in the structure of the two Germanys.
Their support for the goal of a greater Germany will remain more
rhetorical than real.

    Neither neighbor nor ally is eager to see Germans achieve
through an outbreak of peace the dominance they were
spectacularly unable to win through two world wars. There was
something moving about the unusual and spontaneous singing of
the national anthem -- the third verse: "Unity and justice and
freedom/ For the German Fatherland . . ." -- in the West German
Bundestag when the announcement was made that the Wall was being
opened. But it was also a bit chilling to those for whom the
famous chords of the former Deutschland uber Alles are not so
inspiring and for whom the dream of a united German fatherland
more closely resembles a nightmare.

    For some in the Atlantic Alliance, West Germany's urge to
unify eastward raises the specter of neutralism, a concern
heightened by the Gorbasms that occurred when the Soviet leader
visited Bonn in June. For its partners in the twelve-member
European Community, especially France, the economic threat of
a united Germany is less worrisome than the possibility that
Bonn will become preoccupied with pursuing its goals in Central
Europe at the expense of strengthening unity within the E.C.

    Eastern Europe also has cause for discomfort. West German
leaders like to speak of their nation's historic ties to the
region; to many Poles and Czechs and Hungarians, that is as
perverse as it is true. A side benefit of the cold war was that
it alleviated, at least for a generation or two, the fears that
have existed ever since the Teutonic Knights roamed Eastern
Europe in the 13th century, taking on the Balts and the Slavs.

    The U.S. and its NATO allies can play an important role in
encouraging closer ties between the two Germanys while avoiding
the instability this could engender. The organization serves
both to anchor Bonn to the West and to subsume its potential
military might into a cooperative framework. In addition, the
continued existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact provides a
rationale for preserving two separate German states even as they
converge. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's official policy calls for
solving "the German Question" within the context of NATO and
European economic integration. The Warsaw Pact and NATO also
serve the purpose of defusing the nationalist rivalries that
Europe has historically harbored.

    As the revolutionary changes in the Warsaw Pact continue,
NATO's role will inevitably become less military and more
political. Far fewer troops will be needed, and significant
mutual demobilizations in Europe will be possible if both sides
agree. Already NATO's historic mission has changed: the threat
of an invasion from the east involves sputtering Trabants rather
than Soviet tanks.

    The European Community is also a stabilizing influence
because it is integrating Bonn's economy with that of its West
European partners. "The events in Eastern Europe demand that
there be an acceleration in the construction of the E.C.," says
Jacques Delors, the former French Finance Minister who now heads
the European Commission. The E.C. can help anchor the changes
in Eastern Europe by granting economic assistance, trade
concessions and eventually some form of associate membership.

    The West's most immediate goal should be to encourage East
Germany to follow the path of Hungary and Poland toward a freer
economy and a more open political process. The outcome of such
an evolution need not be reunification. For the time being, the
comfort and security of all concerned could be served by having
two German states exist side by side, working in harmony the way
West Germans now do with Austrians or, for that matter,
Canadians with Americans. Eventually, the web of economic and
cultural ties could justify a form of confederation in which
people and goods could move freely between two states that
retain sovereignty. As the concept of national autonomy becomes
blurred in a more unified Europe, the question becomes more
semantic than real. Secretary of State James Baker has begun
speaking of German "reconciliation" rather than reunification.

    Ultimately, the future of Germany can be determined only by
Germans themselves. Washington and Moscow will have a different
opportunity as confrontation turns to cooperation between
Eastern and Western Europe. The superpowers will want to
negotiate the speed and terms of their withdrawal in a manner
that enhances the stability that is in everyone's common
interest.

    Bush and Gorbachev will begin to address these questions at
the Saltwater Summit. What can two men in a boat do when they
put up their feet? Primarily, they will have the chance to
assure each other that they both are eager to avoid crackdowns
in East bloc states. The Club Med casualness will provide the
perfect atmosphere to discuss the beneficial roles that NATO and
the Warsaw Pact could play during a time of exciting but
potentially dangerous transition.

    When Gorbachev began waxing eloquent about a "common
European home," he almost certainly did not anticipate the
scenario that would unfold as the renovators plunged into the
task. But unlike his predecessors, he may understand that the
Soviet Union will be more secure with neighbors who tolerate
free minds, free ideas, free speech, free markets and free
movement. If handled properly, the revolution unfolding in one
country after another opens up opportunities, unimaginable just
a year ago, to create not just a new Europe but a new and far
less menacing world order.


-- James O. Jackson/Bonn and Christopher Ogden/Washington